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WHEN IS COERCION SUCCESSFUL?
And Why Can’t We Agree on It?
Patrick C. Bratton
When is coercion successful? How is success to be defined? Coercion,broadly speaking, is the use of threats to influence another’s behavior.1 Al-
though there is a substantial and growing literature on coercion, there is little con-
sensus within that literature as to what qualifies as a successful example of coercion.
Different authors formulate their own definitions of “success” and apply them to
case studies, often with contrasting findings within the same cases.2 That is because
the literature lacks a clear conceptual framework to analyze coercion. This absence
of a shared framework limits the usefulness of the concept, even though much has
been written about coercion since the seminal work of Thomas Schelling, Arms and
Influence, was published in 1966. There are several deficiencies in the coercion liter-
ature, deficiencies that often lead authors to separate coercion from its actual con-
text within foreign policy. Rather than judging the relative merits of coercive
tools—different types of air power or the effectiveness of economic sanctions—or
the short-term success of a coercive strategy, theorists should look at how and when
coercion actually assists policy makers achieve their greater foreign policy goals.
Two principal weaknesses result from the lack of a conceptual framework: the
absence of agreed definitions of what coercion is and who the coercer and target
are; and disagreement on how to determine success.
At this stage, it is useful to assess the coercion litera-
ture to see why these deficiencies exist and what can be
done in future studies to deal with them. This article,
then, is less an empirical study of coercion than a re-
flective essay attempting to assess where we currently
stand and to explain why there is so little agreement as
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to when coercion is successful.3 Coercion needs to be placed within the larger
field of foreign policies of the relevant actors in order to see how it meets the
needs, concerns, and options of policy makers.4
COERCION: WHAT IS IT, AND WHO DOES IT?
In the almost forty years that have passed since Schelling’s work, the coercion lit-
erature has proved to be less rich and less cumulative than that of its strategic
counterpart, deterrence. Although authors generally agree on what is at the core
of coercion—the use of threats to influence another’s behavior—the coercion
literature suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity as each author seeks to build
his or her own concept rather than refine the work of others.5 This is evident
from the various terms used more or less interchangeably as synonyms for coer-
cion: compellence, coercive diplomacy, military coercion, coercive military
strategy, and strategic coercion.6 This proliferation of terminology has compli-
cated the study of what makes coercion successful, since writers have their own
criteria in mind and studies of even the same cases can lead to opposite conclu-
sions.7 Depending on the author and the term used, the qualities imputed to the
coercive process can vary in three principal ways: the types of threats that are in-
cluded within coercion, the role of the use of force as compared to the threat of
the use of force in coercion, and who the actors are.
What Types of Threats Are Involved?
Coercion is the use of threats to influence the behavior of another (usually a tar-
get state but occasionally a nonstate actor) by making it choose to comply rather
than directly forcing it to comply (i.e., by brute force).8 Some authors separate
compellent threats, made to cause an opponent to stop a current action or to un-
dertake another, from deterrent threats, made to cause an opponent to not take a
certain action, and on that basis discuss compellent threats as if the same as co-
ercion.9 Others include both deterrent and compellent threats as two types of
coercion.10 (Please refer to table 1—which, like the tables that follow, is intended
not as a comprehensive list but as a visual aid.)
Thomas Schelling, in Arms and Influence and his other influential book The




two t y pes of coerc ive
threats, the difference be-
ing that “the threat that
compels rather than deters
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Only compellent threats (i.e., coer-
cion is different from deterrence)
Alexander George, Janice Gross Stein,
Robert Pape
Both compellent and deterrent
threats (deterrence and compellence
are both types of coercion)
Thomas Schelling, Daniel Ellsberg,
Wallace Thies, Lawrence Freedman,
Daniel Byman, and Matthew Waxman
TABLE 1
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often requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts, rather
than if he acts.”12 Deterrence, the better known of the two, is the threat to use
force in retaliation if the opponent takes a certain action. In the words of Robert
Art, “its purpose is to prevent something undesirable from happening.”13
Compellence is the use of threats to make a target stop an action it has already
undertaken, or to take an action that the coercer wants. Schelling elaborates that
the difference between the two types of threats is the “difference between induc-
ing inaction [deterrence] and making someone perform [compellence].”14 It is
generally assumed that compellence should be more difficult to achieve than de-
terrence.15 Deterrence requires only that target states maintain the status quo,
that they do nothing; they can claim that inaction is their free choice. In con-
trast, compellence involves an obvious change in behavior, acquiescence to the
demands of the coercer, that could be costly in terms of prestige and domestic
and international legitimacy.
Clearly, deterrence and compellence are two types of coercion, or two sides of
the same coin. Both concepts depend on risk, threats, and choice. The coercer,
whether seeking to deter or compel, is exploiting the potential risks the oppo-
nent faces in resisting the coercer’s threats. The coercer bases coercion “on the
exploitation of threats, of latent violence,” what is yet to come unless the target
complies.16 In both deterrence and compellence, the target chooses to comply.
Writers on compellence generally assume that the target chooses rather than is
forced to comply, and deterrence writers sometimes forget that “the deterree has
to agree to be deterred.”17 In both cases, in fact, the choice of action versus inac-
tion thus lies with the target.
Coercion, then, depends on two factors: credibility (whether the target be-
lieves that the coercer will execute its threats) and persuasiveness (whether the
threats will have a great impact on the target).18 Credibility normally depends on
whether the coercer has a reputation for carrying out threats that it makes. Per-
suasiveness comes from the ability to threaten great damage to something the
target considers vital. Threats are not automatically both credible and persua-
sive; they can also be one but not the other. For example, in the context of a trade
dispute a threat of nuclear attack would be very persuasive but not very credible.
Schelling distinguishes compellence from “brute force” in that the coercer
credibly threatens the opponent that if the action in question is not stopped, or a
desired action is not taken, force will be used to induce compliance.19 If the op-
ponent does not comply, force is applied. The coercer then hurts the opponent
but not as much as it might, leaving open the threat of even more pain if the op-
ponent still does not comply. In contrast, “brute force” is simply getting what
one wants by violence, as much as it takes.
B R A T T O N 1 0 1
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What Is the Role of Force?
The second conceptual divide concerns the actual or threatened use of force.
The role of force complicates the coercion/compellence literature. Simply put,
writers on deterrence do not spend much time on force, because the use of force
implies the failure of deterrence.20 Depending on the role assigned to the use of
force, much of the coercion literature can be classified into three schools: coer-
cion through diplomacy separate from the use of force; coercion exercised al-
most entirely through the use of force (normally air power); and coercion
exercised by both diplomacy and force.21 Authors of the first school look at coer-
cion as something that happens before “the first bomb is dropped.” The actual
use of force, except for minor demonstrations of resolve, means that coercion
has failed; the coercer is moving to brute force to take what it wants. These au-
thors focus on the diplomatic techniques and difficulties of sending “signals”
that convey clear coercive threats to the target and of “orchestrating” words and
deeds into coherent messages that the target can clearly receive. For this school,
coercion is an outcome produced by clear signaling and orchestration. The term
“coercive diplomacy” here is intended to accentuate the political-diplomatic na-
ture of this type of coercion, as opposed to the use of force to seize or destroy in
“traditional military strategy.” The goal of coercive diplomacy is to persuade the
opponent to halt what he is doing, not to strike him until his capabilities are so re-
duced that further resistance is futile. “Coercive diplomacy, then, calls for using
just enough force of an appropriate kind—if force is used at all—to demonstrate
one’s resolve to protect well-defined interests as well as the credibility of one’s
determination to use more force if necessary.”22
The second school takes a much more forceful approach, viewing coercion as
a process that happens during the use of force, or during the actual use of other
“sticks,” such as economic sanctions. Coercion is the use of force to get the target
to comply with the demands of the coercer, but without completely destroying
the military forces of, and occupying, the target state. These writers look at the
prospective merits of different coercive strategies, like punishment-versus-
denial strategies or force versus economic sanctions. One prominent exemplar
of this view limits his focus to open conflict or warfare, wherein coercion hap-
pens “after the first bomb has been dropped.” For instance, a successful example
of military coercion for him is the American air and naval Pacific campaign,
which in 1945 caused Japan to surrender without having been invaded and con-
quered. In contrast, the air campaign in Europe failed to coerce Germany, which
refused to surrender and had to be overrun. One problem for this school, as has
been pointed out, is that it is hard to distinguish clearly between coercion and
brute force given the scale and intensity of the conflicts studied.23
1 0 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
4
Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 3, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss3/6
A third school of thought draws no sharp distinction between coercion virtu-
ally without force and that exercised only through force. For these writers, coer-
cion includes both “signals” sent by diplomatic and military means and the
actual use of force. For Schelling the use of force is essentially a continuation or
escalation of a threat first articulated before any resort to force. What distin-
guishes coercion from brute force in this school is that force is used in a mea-
sured and controlled way to “signal” to the target the threat of further
punishment unless it complies. Coercion for the third school subsumes “coer-
cive diplomacy” and also includes forceful (sometimes very forceful) actions:
“Coercion depends more on the threat of what is yet to come than on damage al-
ready done.”24 A classic example is the effort of the Lyndon Johnson administra-
tion to coerce the North Vietnamese government to cease its support of the Viet
Cong insurgents in South Vietnam in the 1960s. In the view of a scholar who has
traced this attempt, there is no sharp
break between, first, coercive diplo-
matic efforts backed by very limited
and covert use of force in 1963–64;
second, limited demonstrative uses of
force in reprisals after the Gulf of
Tonkin incident; and third, the escalating air campaign of ROLLING THUNDER.25
In this view the increasing use of force—in a measured and connected way—is a
means of driving home the coercive threat, not necessarily representing the fail-
ure of coercion.
Threats and Force
The lack of a shared definition of coercion limits the scope of many studies, and
unnecessarily. For example, authors who exclude deterrent threats from their
analyses rule out many potentially fruitful areas of research. Similarly, a study of
compellent threats that includes only economic sanctions or air power and not
deterrent threats automatically excludes many potential cases and insights. It
has been suggested that in practice deterrent and compellent threats “mingle”
depending upon the actions and reactions of the coercer and target:
General demands to Iraq, such as “Don’t invade Kuwait,” appear to fall clearly in the
deterrence camp, whereas calls to withdraw seem like compellence. The in-between
areas are more ambiguous. “Don’t go further” involves both stopping an existing ac-
tion and avoiding a future one—both immediate deterrence and coercion. More-
over, a call to withdraw carries with it an implicit demand not to engage in the
offense again and affects the credibility of the deterrence call to not invade Kuwait in
the future.26
B R A T T O N 1 0 3
Coercion before the use of force George, Gross Stein
Coercion only through force Pape
Coercion through diplomacy and force Schelling, Thies
TABLE 2
WHAT ROLE DOES FORCE PLAY IN COERCION?
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Even more problematic, the absence of a common conceptual framework
means that two authors examining the same cases can come to opposite conclu-
sions. If their criteria and definitions differ, so will their conclusions as to when
coercion is successful or not. A writer using the coercive diplomacy framework
almost excludes the use of force;27 according to coercive military strategy, how-
ever, the use of force is not in itself the failure of coercion.
These differing conceptual frameworks result, for example, in opposite
points of view on the 1990–91 Gulf War. One scholar codes the 1990–91 Gulf
War as a failure of compellence; Iraq’s refusal to withdraw from Kuwait meant
that compellence had failed, since the coalition’s objective was to get Iraq to
leave Kuwait without using force.28 In contrast, another lists the Gulf War as a
success for a coercive air strategy of denial. The U.S.-led coalition was able to use
military force to get Baghdad to retreat from Kuwait without having to invade
and occupy Iraq wholesale.29
NATO’s air war over Kosovo in 1999 may be an even better example. If one
views coercion as the use of force only, Operation ALLIED FORCE looks like a suc-
cess. NATO’s bombing campaign caused the Serbs to withdraw from Kosovo
without a ground war and to allow the presence of NATO peacekeeping troops.30
Many believe that “the prophecies of Giulio Douhet and other air power vision-
aries appear[ed to have been] realized,” that air power can coerce by itself.31
However, if one adopts the perspective that coercion is exercised through both
diplomacy and force, Kosovo seems at best like a limited and belated success, if
not a failure. From March 1998 to March 1999, when Operation ALLIED FORCE
began, the Serbs withstood various attempts at coercive diplomacy, which led
the Serbs to believe that they could depopulate Kosovo and get away with it.32 In
his view, the claim that the air war succeeded because the Serbs eventually capit-
ulated begs the question of why it was necessary to have an air war at all. What
led the Serbs to believe that they could ignore a full year of coercive threats, ap-
parently without fear of force being used against them?33 NATO’s coercion of
Serbia did not begin “once the first bomb was dropped” but a full year before.
Looking for coercion only in the air war and not the deterrence and compellence
failures that preceded it effectively excludes from consideration many of the
most interesting questions about coercion, about how it works and why it suc-
ceeds or fails.
Who Are the Actors?
Coercion writers have for the most part assumed that states involved in coercion
are unitary, rational actors.34 Schelling, an economist by training, often incorpo-
rated into his writings examples drawn from interpersonal relations—such as
mugger and victim, buyer and seller, parent and child—that assume the rational,
1 0 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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value maximizing actors of classic economic theory. This model takes the costs
of noncompliance (sticks) and of compliance (carrots) as the independent vari-
ables, to be raised and lowered, respectively, against change in the target state’s
policies as the dependent variable.35 The general underlying theory suggests that
if the coercer can make not complying costlier than complying, coercion should
be successful. If not, coercion is likely to fail. Success is conventionally thought
of as achieved when the target complies with the coercer’s demands. This pre-
sumption implies that the coercer does not need to know a great deal about the
target, only to “step into its shoes” and imagine how a rational, calculating actor
would respond to sticks and carrots.
Some more recent authors have slightly modified this assumption, to ac-
knowledge, for instance, that factions within a target state can influence its reac-
tions (Japan in 1945 is an excellent example). One scholar argues that various
types of economic sanctions are more or less effective depending on whether the
target is democratic or an authoritarian regime. Another makes a convincing
point that whether the coercing state has a strong presidential system or a parlia-
mentary one can affect how effectively it sends signals.36
Schelling himself conceded that there is a difference between coercing an in-
dividual and coercing a government, but he did not develop the point exten-
sively.37 It has been subsequently pointed out that the rational actor model
forgets that the coercer and the target of the coercion are actually governments
rather than individuals: “Governments are coalitions of numerous individual
decision-makers, virtually all of whom occupy positions within large, semi-
autonomous, bureaucratic organizations; any government involved in an at-
tempt at coercion is likely to speak with many voices at once.”38
In most, if not all, instances of coercion, groups or individuals in the target
state’s government have staked their positions and reputations on the policies or
actions that cause the coercion in the first place.39 It is likely to be extremely diffi-
cult, if possible at all, to convince them that the costs of pursuing this policy
would be prohibitive, no matter how high those costs become. Moreover, as has
been suggested, it is difficult “to assess the impact of particular coercive pres-
sures” upon the adversary’s decision-making process.40 Different targets will not
respond identically to the same coercive threats.41 A convincing case can be
made that the type of regime targeted for economic coercion has a great effect
on the types of coercive threats that are most effective against it.42 Even in the
same state, individuals or groups might react differently to coercive threats, and
some might be more or less responsive to various types of threats to different
parts of the target. “For officials involved in an attempt at coercion, then, the
problems that they must confront include not only deciding what demands they
B R A T T O N 1 0 5
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should make of an opponent but also learning who on the other side must do
what if the attempt at coercion is to succeed and how can the coercer’s action be
manipulated, if at all.”43
Diplomatic threats might mean more to people in a foreign ministry than in a
defense ministry, and economic sanctions might have more impact on elected
officials than on nonelected ones. One target might be more vulnerable to
threats to its industrial centers, while another’s military forces might be more
susceptible; yet others are not particularly sensitive to threats to either. It has
been argued that a coercer needs to determine the Clausewitzian “centers of
gravity”—the target’s greatest sources of strength, either material or intangible,
that “if destroyed, would cause the enemy’s resistance to collapse[;] . . . only by
threatening the state’s center of gravity can a coercer compel the greatest conces-
sions from the target state.”44 The record of attempts to coerce Saddam Hussein
shows that he was most sensitive to threats to his relationship with his power
base; that threats to his conventional military power, public sentiment, or the
Iraqi economy were less effective.45
That individuals within a target government react differently to coercive
measures suggests that even if a coercer succeeded in getting demands accepted
in the short term, it would be very difficult to secure complete acquiescence in
the long term, because certain members of the target’s government would at-
tempt to reinstate their objectionable policies, since their political careers (and
in some regimes, their lives) depend on it. Coercers, then, need to know a great
deal about the regime’s composition and internal political struggles, not con-
ceptualize it as a “rational, calculating actor.” The coercer needs to know the “po-
litical realities within the target state’s government and to shape their policies in
a way that maximizes the influence of those in the target state’s government
whose hopes and fears are most compatible with the coercer’s objectives.”46 In
some cases there will be factions that are compatible with the coercer’s desires, in
others not.
To illustrate the effects of internal politics on the responses of targets, it is
useful to compare the successful case of coercion in the Cuban missile crisis in
October 1962 with the failure against North Vietnam from 1963 to 1968. In the
former, Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to deploy the missiles to Cuba was taken
only about six months before the crisis erupted.47 In addition, he made his
choices very quickly and with only a small circle of advisers; there was relatively
little political or bureaucratic struggle over the decision to deploy the missiles.48
The Soviets appeared surprised by the Kennedy administration’s firm reaction
to the missiles and not to have considered the possibility of war—even a limited
one in the Caribbean, let alone a nuclear one—with the United States. Given
their surprise and lack of preparation for a war, it is perhaps understandable that
1 0 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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they yielded when offered tangible incentives (the pledge not to invade Cuba
and the offer to withdraw missiles from Turkey).49
In contrast, the North Vietnamese decision to aid the Viet Cong and resist
American pressure was the outcome of a bitter intraparty debate—involving fig-
ures, like Le Duan, who had staked their political reputations and careers in the
North Vietnamese government on not yielding to American pressure—over the
course of an entire decade.50 As a result of this debate, the North Vietnamese
government took seriously the threat of conflict with the United States, even a
direct American invasion of North Vietnam, and vigorously prepared for such
an eventuality. Unlike the Soviets in Cuba, the North Vietnamese were unsur-
prised by American pressure, even escalating force. “We can hypothesize that the
longer the bureaucratic battles involved, the more rigid the positions of the par-
ticipants will become and the greater the stake each participant will have in in-
suring that his preferred course of action is adopted.”51
For its part, the coercing state is made up of competing bureaus and organiza-
tions. Orchestrating clear signals can be difficult, because “the leadership itself
speaks with many voices at once, and there is no guarantee that every voice will
convey the same message.”52 Messages sent by governments can thus be contra-
dictory and self-defeating. For example, in June 1998, American threats meant
to induce Serbia to halt its offensive against Kosovo were supposed to be rein-
forced by open planning for a military intervention and by air exercises.53 Unfor-
tunately, these efforts were undermined by public comments of national
security adviser Samuel Berger and Secretary of Defense William Cohen that no
plans for military intervention were “on the table” and that the exercises were
only that, exercises.54
Even given agreement on the use of a coercive strategy, the issues of how,
when, and with what tools that strategy is to be implemented can be contentious
and reduce its effectiveness. Members of various agencies will probably suggest
policies that draw upon their organizations’ expertise—military action for de-
fense ministries, diplomatic action for foreign ministries, etc. For example, in
the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, as many argue, the People’s Liberation Army
played a key role in a decision to shift the unification strategies of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) from “peaceful coexistence” to coercive diplomacy
through shows of force—missile tests and military exercises—to make
compellent threats to the Republic of China.55 It has been argued that the Army
did so because it saw the diplomatic sanctions of the Chinese Ministry of For-
eign Affairs—the cancellation of visits and the recall of the ambassador to
Washington—as “weak and indecisive.”56 Individuals and organizations within
the same state can find themselves in intense competition for the adoption of
“their” policies over rivals’, or put organizations or services at cross purposes.
B R A T T O N 1 0 7
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Therefore (see table 3), coercion theorists need to analyze the reactions of the
target as the responses of groups and organizations rather than of a rational in-
dividual. Theorists must also take into consideration the fact that the coercer is
not a unitary rational actor either.
PROCESSES AND OUTCOMES
Much of the literature on coercion (whatever the term used) is devoted to the
practice of coercive strategies rather than the results of coercion. This is particu-
larly true of works that focus on air power and economic sanctions as coercive
instruments.57 This approach, while valuable, risks suggesting that the right
strategy and the right coercive tool will prevail no matter the consequences or
setting. In other words, the right strategy will actually have yielded very little in
the long term if the target continues to take actions like those that caused the co-
ercion in the first place.58
It is often forgotten that coercion is only a tool of foreign policy and that “suc-
cess” in coercion depends not only upon the tactical success of a particular coer-
cive strategy but also upon the benefits accruing to the foreign policies of
coercing states. Coercion does not take place within a vacuum; important politi-
cal, historical, and situational factors influence outcomes.59 “The effectiveness of
coercive strategies will therefore depend on the overall political context in which
they are implemented, and even a potentially promising use of force can be
squandered by an ineffectual diplomacy.”60
It must be remembered that coercion is not a substitute for an effective for-
eign policy.61 A comprehensive study has been made of American political uses
of military forces, including coercive (both deterrent and compellent) threats
and deployments in support of allies, between 1946 and 1975. It found that most
of the time these actions served only to buy time and that the effectiveness de-
clined sharply over time.62 It “should be recognized that these military opera-
tions cannot substitute for more fundamental policies and actions—diplomacy,
close economic and cultural relations, an affinity of mutual interests and
1 0 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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perceptions—which can form the basis either for sound and successful alliances
or for stable adversary relations.”63 If coercion, then, can produce only a breathing
space, the coercer needs to consider using that time to “reduce the motivation un-
derlying that [aggressive] intention, and/or to provide alternative goals that may be
relatively satisfactory to the deterred [or in this case, the coerced] power.”64
For example, it has been argued that China was successful in its efforts to co-
erce Taiwan during the 1995–96 crisis. At first glance, the PRC does seem to have
achieved some of its goals in the short term, with respect both to Washington
and Taipei. In Washington, President William Clinton gave a public assurance
that the United States did not support “a two-China policy, Taiwan indepen-
dence, or Taiwan membership in the UN.” In Taipei, the pro-independence
Democratic People’s Party made a poor showing in the March 1996 elections,
President Lee Teng-hui scaled back his “independence diplomacy,” and Beijing
found itself taken more seriously in the region, especially regarding its willing-
ness to use military force over Taiwan.65
However, the long-term benefits of that coercion for China are less clear. The
American and Taiwanese defense relationship, which had been left uncertain
under the American policy of “calculated ambiguity,” was now clarified: the
United States was both willing and able to defend Taiwan militarily.66 Beijing’s
actions increased the perception in Washington of the PRC as a threat, particu-
larly among the “anti-China” lobby.67 American and Taiwanese defense coopera-
tion, which had been almost withering away, as some feel, since the 1970s, was
renewed and strengthened by Beijing’s threats.68 President Lee, who won the
election, after a short pause resumed his efforts to increase Taiwan’s interna-
tional recognition, including lobbying for UN membership, high-profile visa
requests, and international trips (his “transit diplomacy”).69 Security arrange-
ments between the United States and other powers in the region, like Japan and
South Korea, were also increased, and if other Asian countries took Beijing more
seriously, it was because they had reassessed the PRC as a possible future security
threat.70 “The international reaction to China’s military coercion surprised
Beijing, which had hoped that most countries would close their eyes to its efforts
to punish Taiwan. . . . In fact, Beijing’s actions quickly internationalized the Tai-
wan issue in a way that had not occurred since 1971. . . . By going too far, Beijing
catalyzed international opinion against itself.”71
Coding Coercive Outcomes
Most authors categorize the outcomes of coercion as either “success” or “fail-
ure.” “Success” is said to occur if the target concedes to a significant part of the
coercer’s demands, and “failure” when it does not. A scholar associated with this
“unidimensional” criterion, analyzing strategic bombing campaigns, codes as
B R A T T O N 1 0 9
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successes the campaigns against Japan in 1942–45 and North Korea in 1950–53,
the LINEBACKER raids in 1972, and the 1990–91 Gulf War, but as failures the cam-
paign against Nazi Germany in 1942–45 and ROLLING THUNDER in 1965–68.72
Others reject this simple approach.73 One argues, for instance, that a
unidimensional criterion for success—that the target concedes to a “significant
part of the coercer’s demands”—“does not allow for gradations in the degree or
kind of success.”74 Such an analysis, on this view, ignores both the costs for the
coercer of using sanctions and the possibilities of partial success. In other words,
a “multidimensional” approach would acknowledge that sanctions, for instance,
can be useful to policy makers without “working” in and of themselves.75 It is
worth quoting one scholar at length on this point:
What policymakers “most want to know” is not, as [scholar Robert] Pape asserts,
“when the strategy of economic sanctions can change another state’s behavior with-
out resorting to military force,” but rather when economic sanctions are likely to
have more utility than military force. The deductive case for using economic sanc-
tions is not based solely on the comparative effectiveness of military force and eco-
nomic sanctions, as Pape implies; it is based on their comparative utility, which is a
function of both effectiveness and costs. Thus it is quite possible for sanctions to be
more useful than force even in situations in which they are less effective.76
Some demands will be easier for the target to meet than others; “a moderate de-
gree of success in accomplishing a difficult task may seem more important than
a high degree of success in accomplishing an easy task.”77
For one scholar, whatever the form of coercion, the more important question
“is not whether it works, but whether it is useful, and if so, whether it is worth-
while.”78 Another, moreover, criticizes the “simple dichotomy of success/failure”
in the economic sanctions literature. The idea that success is a return to the sta-
tus quo ante and failure anything else is an unfair test. On this view, outcomes
need to include the possibilities of compromise between the actors and to take
into consideration what is demanded of the target.79
Other “multidimensionalists” look not for either success or failure but for
marginal changes in the probability of behavior.80 It is not an “either-or” contest.
Further, different coercive tools can work together to produce results; “eco-
nomic and military pressure can act together synergistically—just as naval and
infantry forces usually work with air power.”81 Coercion, it is argued, is a dy-
namic process; because the target is not static, it can attempt both to neutralize
coercive pressures and coerce the coercer in return.82 This interaction can lead to
unpredictable results that do not fit neatly into complete successes or failures.83
As has been argued, it is misleading to code cases of coercion in absolute bi-
nary metrics, with “success” and “failure” the only possible outcomes. An attempt
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at coercion that “fails” does not necessarily return the situation to that which
previously existed; the new situation could be much worse for the coercer. In any
case the coercer must pay enforcement or implementation costs, and these can
outweigh the benefits of even successful coercion, making it Pyrrhic.84 A com-
parison between the international position of the United States in 1963, before
the expansion of the coercive conflict against Hanoi, and in 1973, at the time of
the withdrawal from Vietnam, shows that “failure” does not simply mean re-
turning to the previous status quo.
Authors (see table 4) then need to expand the framework on coercion to in-
clude results that cannot neatly fit into either success or failure. All too often, co-
ercion and coercive tools are viewed “in a vacuum” and are judged on their
ability to coerce in and of themselves.85 The focus of much of the literature on
coercive tools reinforces a belief that success in a particular coercive strategy will
translate into the achievement of some policy goal.86
Coercion and the Great Air Power Debate
The tendency to study coercive methods at the expense of their long-term con-
sequences is perhaps most marked among writers who focus on the role of air
power as a coercive tool. The failure of air power in the Vietnam War and its ap-
parent recent success in the Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have both
rekindled the “great air power debate”—Can air power win wars by itself?—and
have tied that debate to coercion.87 Like coercion theorists, air power proponents
have sought to show that it can force a target to capitulate with its military forces
undefeated, while air power pessimists have doubted the ability of air power to
“do it alone.”88
In an attempt to resolve the air power debate by combining it with the coer-
cion literature, a distinction was drawn between denial strategies, which target
and disrupt the enemy’s military strategy through the combined pressure of the-
ater air and ground forces, and punishment strategies, in which strategic air
power targets civilian centers. The conclusion from the case studies adduced
is that denial strategies can produce successful coercion while punishment
strategies are rarely successful. In that case, the best (if not only) way to coerce
B R A T T O N 1 1 1
Full compliance with coercer’s demands, independent
of any other factors
Pape
Need to distinguish degrees of success. Possible to have
partial success or secure secondary objectives without
securing primary objectives
Kimberly Elliot, Drezner, Karl Mueller,
and Byman and Waxman
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successfully is to “undermine the target state’s confidence in its own military
strategy.”89 Once the costs of resisting are higher than the costs of surrendering,
coercion can succeed; hence, the successful coercer manipulates effectively “the
costs and benefits” of continuing the action in question. However, denial is not a
silver bullet; it is not guaranteed to work in all situations. It is most effective
against an opponent who uses a conventional military strategy that depends on
massive logistical support and communications and offers lucrative targets for
air strikes. On the contrary, if the opponent relies on a guerrilla strategy that de-
pends on local support and slight logistical “tail,” denial is likely to fail.
An illustration of the superiority of denial strategies might be the Johnson
administration’s failure to coerce Hanoi by means of a combination of punish-
ment and denial strategies from 1965 to 1968 (ROLLING THUNDER), as com-
pared to the success of the Richard Nixon administration’s denial strategy in
1972 (LINEBACKER I and II).90 Conventional punishment failed, as some argue it
almost always will, and conventional denial failed as well, because bombing
could not easily disrupt Hanoi’s guerrilla strategy of the earlier period, which re-
quired no elaborate logistical network. However, when Hanoi switched to a con-
ventional strategy in its 1972 offensive against South Vietnam, it became
vulnerable to the denial bombing campaigns of LINEBACKER I and II. These
campaigns, it is argued, halted the North Vietnamese offensive and brought Ha-
noi to agree to U.S. demands at the negotiating table: “The bombing was a coer-
cive success, forcing the North to cease its ground offensive and accept a
cease-fire, even though it retained the capacity to continue organized military
action.”91
Such conclusions about the LINEBACKER strikes are an excellent example of
the dangers of concentrating on coercive tools but losing sight of the actual
long-term effects of coercion. It is true that in the short term the LINEBACKER
strikes disrupted the North Vietnamese offensive and guaranteed the indepen-
dence of South Vietnam during the American withdrawal. However, what the
North could not accomplish in 1973 it accomplished in 1975, when Saigon fell. It
seems a stretch to list the LINEBACKER campaign with the surrender of Japan in
1945 or the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 as a successful example of coercion. To
do so would lower the standards to endorse policies that at best only buy time or
save face, rather than secure desired outcomes.
Coercion and the Sanctions Debate
In contrast to the air power debate, the economic sanctions debate largely con-
cerns the merits of sanctions themselves rather than the relative merits of differ-
ent types. Some authors attempt to judge sanctions on their ability to coerce
targets by themselves; for these authors, success is when the target complies with
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the coercer’s demands, failure is when they do not. Judged by this standard sanc-
tions appear to be a “notoriously poor tool of statecraft,” with a very low success
rate.92 At first glance this seems to be a logical and rigorous standard; in fact,
however, it is an unrealistic and unfair test for economic sanctions.93
As has been pointed out, economic sanctions cannot be evaluated only by
their ability to coerce targets by themselves.94 The costs and benefits of economic
sanctions must be evaluated within the context of other instruments that policy
makers have at their disposal, such as military force or diplomacy. Moreover, de-
pending on that context, “ineffective” economic sanctions might be the best, or
the only, option available.95 There are always costs to using coercion, and the
most “effective” tools are not always the most useful.96 In certain circumstances,
for instance, the use of military force is unthinkable. For example, during the
1956 Suez crisis, President Dwight Eisenhower wanted to coerce two allies, Brit-
ain and France, but military force could hardly be used against liberal demo-
cratic allies, however “effective” it might be in theory. The president instead
threatened an economic sanction—refusal to let the International Monetary
Fund provide a backup loan to Britain (the currency of which was under in-
creasing pressure) or to give access to dollar credits to pay for oil imports from
dollar zones in North and South America.97 If economic sanctions are “notori-
ously poor tools of statecraft,” are there any better tools that are low cost, always
available, and highly likely to succeed? The answer, once again (see table 5), de-
pends on the definition of success.98
WHERE DOES THE FIELD GO FROM HERE?
This controversy over success and outcomes does more than complicate aca-
demic arguments; it has consequences for policy. States have used coercion at
least since the time of Thucydides, and all indications from recent events—the
1999 war over Kosovo, Indo-Pakistani standoffs, Russian pressure on Georgia,
and the American pressure against Iraq—imply that states will continue to use
coercion as a foreign policy tool.99 Yet for all the rich history of coercion and
manifest willingness of many states to use it, coercion lacks a commonly ac-
cepted conceptual framework. Should policy makers think of deterrence and co-
ercion as separate strategies having nothing to do with one another, or of
deterrent and compellent threats as two types of coercion that may overlap in
B R A T T O N 1 1 3
Whether or not certain coercive tools (air power
strategies, economic sanctions, etc.) can coerce by
themselves
Pape
How coercive tools can help meet the greater foreign
policy goals for statesmen
David Baldwin, Mueller, Elliot, and Byman and Waxman
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practice? Can a coercer simply reason deductively, on the basis of how rational
individuals would respond to threats and pressure? Or does a coercer need to have
accurate intelligence on the composition and politics of the target’s decision-
making system? How can policy makers know the difference between conditions
and techniques that are conducive to success and those that are not, when the
very meaning of “success” is contested? Do air power and economic sanctions
need to be effective by themselves to be useful?
Three things could be done to increase the understanding of when coercion
“works” and when it does not. First, coercive theorists should concentrate on
building a solid, shared definition of coercion, rather than each one designing
his or her own topic with its own qualifications. A third school, one that consid-
ers both the threat and the use of force, should provide an adequate compromise
on the role force should play in coercion, since it acknowledges that the answer
depends on the case in question. At times threats are all that might be required,
at other times only force might work, and many cases will fall somewhere in
between.
Indeed, the answers to some of the questions listed above as left open by the
literature are in fact clear enough. The reasons, after all, that effective coercion is
rare are, first, that states sending and receiving signals do not behave as unified
actors, and second, that coercion is best viewed as a process rather than an out-
come, being the product of a wide array of interactions among distinctive inter-
national actors.100 Neither the coercing government nor a target government is a
unitary, rational actor. Further, coercers do need to know a great deal about the
nature of the target to determine whether it is likely to be coercible, and if so,
what kinds of threats will be most effective. Because they are not unitary actors,
coercers can rarely send clear “signals” or “orchestrate” coherent messages, and
targets can rarely be relied upon to listen to the correct messages or draw the
right conclusions.101
Second, concerning the outcomes of coercion, it would be useful to analyze
coercion in terms of positive and negative outcomes rather than successes or
failures. It has been argued that studies should focus on the “outcomes related to
the principal behavior desired by [the coercer and the target].”102 As suggested
earlier, the dependent variable should be defined as a marginal change in the be-
havior of the target rather than in absolute terms—complete compliance with
the coercer’s demands versus no compliance at all. The more the outcome suits
the desires of the coercer, the more positively the outcome can be rated. If the
target does not change its behavior to suit the coercer’s demands—by maintain-
ing its current behavior or intensifying its activities—the outcome can be judged
as negative. Outcomes achieved in the short term can differ from what emerges in
the long term, as the examples of the LINEBACKER raids and the 1995–96 Taiwan
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Strait crisis illustrate. Moreover, the outcomes can be positive for both the coercer
and the target if a compromise can be found that is acceptable for both; in truly di-
sastrous cases, one can conceive negative outcomes for both.103
Third, writers need to place coercion in the perspective of the greater foreign
policies of states rather than concentrate on “how-to” approaches, and they
should not assume that the success of a particular coercive strategy will meet the
needs and concerns, and fit the options, of policy makers. It would be useful to
consider not only how examples of coercion play out but also their long-term
impacts (positive or negative) on the triggering events, the internal politics of
both coercers and targets, and the relations between the actors in the years fol-
lowing the coercive acts.104 What is needed is a comparative study that goes be-
yond the incidents of coercion themselves to examine the contexts in which the
selected cases occurred and their aftermaths, in order to see when coercion in
combination with an effective foreign policy can yield long-term benefits.105 As
is often said, “It is possible to win the war but lose the peace.” The political inter-
actions at the end of a crisis, or just following a conflict, can be just as vital as the
ones just before.106 What Colin Gray has said of competent strategists could be
applied to competent coercive strategies: “A competent strategist . . . balances
means with ends and understands that lasting success requires the definition of
the international order which erstwhile foes find tolerable. An incompetent
strategist . . . fails to define and settle for such an order.”107
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